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POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF PENSION PLANS
ON AGGREGATE PERSONAL SAVING
The growth of group pension plans has given a new importance to the
old question of whether they affect the total volume of saving in the
economy. As this institution spreads, saving in other forms may be
reduced by an equal amount, leaving the rate of total saving un-
changed, as is to be expected with most shifts in demand. Substitution
among products is the reflection in the marketplace of changing pro-
duction techniques and standards of taste in the economy at large.
And this is true for substitutions among forms of saving when financial
needs and institutions change. Alterations in form will not materially
change the total volume of saving so long as the new assets are close
substitutes for the old.
In several respects, however, group pension plans are imperfect sub-
stitutes for other forms of saving and may on balance add appreciably
to the total. They are set up to cover large groups; as a result, they
require nearly all eligible workers to participate and do not allow
variations in provisions—particularly the amount contributed—to suit
particular individuals. In addition, most plans do not permit loans or
lump-sum payments before retirement and so cannot be counted on
as a reserve fund for contingencies. In short, the plans are inflexible
and ilhiquid compared with other outlets for saving, such as savings
accounts, securities, or life insurance with a cash-surrender value.
Furthermore, most do not vest the benefits from the employer's con-
tribution in the employee at an early date, which means that, though
the participant in a contributory plan is sure of receiving his .own
contribution in a lump-sum refund or retirement income should he
ever change jobs, he will not qualify for benefits financed by his em-
ployer should he change jobs before a stipulated age and term of
service. This uncertainty over whether he will benefit from the em-2 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
ployer's contribution sharply reduces its value to the employee and
its substitutability for his other
The rapid growth of pension funds must be attributed to advantages
other than flexibility or liquidity. A possible attraction is the very
inflexibility of the plans. Some people may prefer to save under formal
arrangements, possibly because of the convenience (regular deductions
made from the paycheck) or the strong inducement to save regularly
and avoid backsliding. Also, group plans are presumably cheaper to
administer (offer more benefits per dollar of contribution) than indi-
vidual ones.
There may be advantages to the employer to induce him to incur
the trouble and expense of paying part of gross wages in .the form of
contributions to a pension plan. He may hope to improve his public
relations with the community by fostering a reputation for taking
care of his workers after they retire. Another, more tangible, advantage
is the dampening effect of pensions on turnover, since an employee
without vested rights who changes jobs receives no benefits from the
employer's
Another advantage—income tax deferment—deserves emphasis be-
cause it has become important concomitantly with the rapid growth
of plans and also because it ought to induce a substitution of pension
contributions for other forms of saving.
The federal income tax has usually applied to income received in
cash or its equivalent. Nonwage fringe benefits provided by employers,
including their contributions to qualified pension funds as well as the
interest earnings, are not taxed as income to employees. (Any contri-
butions to plans by employees are taxed and are not involved in this
exemption.) When the employee draws on the pension in his retire-
ment years, of course, the payment is taxed as income, but his income
tax is then reduced by the double exemption (if he is over 65) and
probably also by a lower effective tax rate. Thus, the exemption of the
employer's contribution allows employees to receive a tax deferment
on part of their pay if it is put into a pension fund. To meet the
technicalities of the tax code, employees' paychecks do not list em-
ployers' pension contributions as part of total income. For economic
1.Onthese points, see W. C. Greenough and F. P. King, Retirement and insurance
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analysis (even if not tax law), all fringe benefits belong in total in-
come.2 It would, of course, be difficult to attach a precise dollar figure
to many of them, especially pension contributions made on a group
basis. Nevertheless, a dollar of total income so defined purchases more
equity in a pension fund than in a private annuity—typically from 20
to 30 cents more at current tax rates.3 This can be viewed as a fall in
the price (or a rise in the return) of those assets purchased through
approved plans. Since a fall in price leads to an increase in the amount
demanded, the sharp rise in income tax rates may in large part explain
the growth of pension plans since the early 1940's without assuming
any change in consumer preferences for them.
The probable efficiencies of providing annuities in large numbers
would explain the prevalence of group plans, but not their rapid
growth at this particular time. An important factor associated with
World War H was the sharp rise in income tax rates. Government
wage controls, by exempting employers' contributions, were also im-
portant at that time because they enabled firms to attract labor in a
tight market by offering higher gross wages. Then, in the early 1950's,
the rate of growth of new pension plans spurted. This occurred at
about the same time that income taxes were increased in the Korean
war; in the same period, also, the Supreme Court (in the Inland Steel
case) confirmed a 1948 ruling of the National Labor Relations Board
that labor unions may bargain for pen sion programs.
With the tax exemption, saving through pension plans yields a
higher return. The theory of consumer choice—assuming preferences
and total income unchanged—implies that total personal saving in-
2 The Department of Commerce includes estimates of supplementary labor income
(fringe benefits not in kind) in personal income and saving, and statements about
aggregate personal saving in the following pages adhere to this definition. In the
sample survey, discussed subsequently, income and saving reported by households
undoubtedly exclude nonwage fringe benefits, and references to income and saving
as reported by these households should be understood to exclude all such benefits.
3 Total revenues from income taxes are reduced by the same amount, because the
employer's contribution is a deductible business expense. Paying wages and salaries
in this form does not raise before-tax profits and so does not produce more revenue
for the corporate incon•e tax.
Restrictions on the deductibility of this expense were extended by the Internal
Revenue Code of 1942, which specified that pension plans had to be nondiscrimina-
tory among employees to be deductible. This regulation was intended to prevent the
use of plans to pay high benefits to executives only, as might otherwise have hap-
.pened, especially because of the excçss profits tax then in effect.4 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
creases because the price of a pension fund has declined, but increases
by no more than the amount contributed to pensions because their
provisions allow no higher contribution. Also, pension contributions
may substitute for other forms of saving. At one extreme—full substi-
tution—total saving will be unchanged, and at the other extreme—no
substitution—it will be higher by the full amount contributed. Accord-
ingly, nonpension saving might stay the same or might decline by some
fraction of the amount contributed to pension funds.
In a statistical comparison of households designed to explore this
range of possibilities, reported income will not include the value of
nonwage fringe benefits. The total income of a household covered by
a pension plan is thus higher by the discounted value of the expected
return from pension benefits (taking account of possible job changes)
attributable to the employer's contribution; but, as reported by the
household, pension coverage has not changed total income. Ordinarily,
households with higher total incomes spend more on a variety of items.
But here the extra income is received in the form of an equity in a
pension fund and in contributory plans entails additional payments by
the household, so that, in order to spend more on other items, house-
holds must somewhere reduce expenditures. Reductions would logi-
cally occur among the substitutes for pension contributions, namely,
other saving, but not by the full amount of pension saving because
income is higher. The ratio of total saving to reported income would
therefore be higher; that to total income, including fringe benefits,
would be the same or higher, and not lower unless the income elas-
ticity of the saving ratio was negative (which no one contends).
Other kinds of fringe benefits create complicating effects. Households
covered by pensions are likely to have more of other fringe benefits and
so to have higher incomes, including all such benefits. On this score,
they should spend more on including financial assets. If
many fringe benefits were substitutes for other forms of saving, how-
ever, covered households would then save less in other forms. The
total effect of fringe benefits on savingnot clear. One might guess
that the total effect is to reduce other saving, since these benefits con-
sist mainly of contributions to pension funds and various kinds of
insurance that reduce the need for reserve funds. On this reasOning,Effects on Aggregate Personal Saving 5
covered households might have lower ratios of other saving to reported
income.
Averages for a representative sample of households large enough to
suppress random errors should bear out these conclusions, so long as
the assumption of no change in preferences remains valid. Quite dif-
ferent results seem possible, however, once other kinds of behavior
ruled out by this assumption are admitted. Many households may dis-
play ignorance or indifference toward pension plans and react passively
to becoming covered, in which case they would make no change in their
consumption expenditures other than minor reductions here and there
if necessary to make up for any contributions deducted from their pay-
checks. Such a reaction is equivalent to a change in (or lack of) prefer-
ences, because the covered households do not adjust to the new array
cif possibilities opened up by the pension plan; this behavior can be
rationalized as a shift in preferences. Nevertheless, it does not lead to
observable results different from the preceding theory. The passive
response also produces no change or a slight decline in other saving,
and a rise in total saving by nearly the full amount contributed to
pension funds by employees and employers.
One possibility that gives a different result is suggested by the of ten-
repeated contention of insurance salesmen that their best prospects are
veterans with GJ. insurance. "Get a man to break the ice with his first
dollar of insurance or saving," their adage seems to go, "and other
dollars will follow the first." The implication is that a man buys in-
formation as well as a claim with his first purchase of these items, and
perhaps also cultivates a taste thereby for financial security; he takes
a new look at retirement needs and available ways to save for them,
and overcomes an indifference bordering on distaste that previously
discouraged these expenditures. To be sure, financial salesmen could
be observing a tendency for young men with G.I. insurance to have
higher than average propensities to save and so be the best prospects
for further purchases. This is in line with the foregoing theory. But if
the first acquisitions do change preferences in favor of more, a differ-
ent phenomenon will be observed: government insurance distributed
among the population at random, such as G.I. insurance seems to have
been, induces the insured households not to substitute it for their other
insurance but to acquire even more. Applied to pensions, this behavior6 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
suggests that a plan instituted among a large group of workers more
or less at crystallizes dormant saving intentions and induces an
increase in their other saving. This sort of behavior cannot be deduced
from the pure theory of consumer choice, not at least assuming full
knowledge.
Economists have not been unaware. of this possibility. In 1950
George Garvy, assessing the effect of the rapid growth of group pension
plans, wrote: "Some individuals may even be inclined to save more to
supplement the (On the whole) relatively meager pensions, now that for
many the prospect of spending their last years working or with rela-
tives or in an institution are no longer the only alternatives."
George Katona has voiced a similar opinion:
Do collective security arrangements obviate the need for independent sav-
ing? We must remember that in former generations, financial protection for
old age was not generally achieved by individual savings efforts. In many
socioeconomic groups this type of aid was provided by relatives, particularly
grown children. Also, at the present time and probably for years to come,
there is a considerable gap between the standard of living to which an em-
ployed family is accustomed and the standard of living provided by social-
security benefits and private pension plans. Therefore it is conceivable that
the minimal protection afforded by collective insurance plans stimulates
people to save in order to achieve a more adequate and complete level of
protection.5
From all these considerations it may be concluded that pension plans
ought not to decrease aggregate personal saving, but whether they have
increased it none at all (because they substitute perfectly for other sav-
ing) or by more than the amount contributed (because of the opposite
effect just discussed) is not clear.
Briefly, the evidence presented in the following chapters suggests
that pension plans do in fact increase aggregate personal saving and
by about (possibly slightly more than) the full amount of employees'
and employers' contributions to the plans. A detailed analysis of the
data also reveals evidence of the partial substitution of pension con-
4"TheEffect of Private Pension Plans on Personal Savings," Review of Economics
and Statistics, August 1950, pp. 223—226. Cf. Charles L. Dearing, Industrial Pensions,
Washington, 1954, pp. 173—174, who foresees zero substitution.
5"AttitudesToward Saving and Borrowing," in Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Consumer Instalment Credit, Washington, 1957, Part II, Vol. I, pp.
453—454. Also see his book, The Powerful Consumer., New York, 1960, pp. 98—99.Effects on Aggregate Personal Saving 7
tributions for other saving in households having fully vested rights and
making fairly large contributions of their own. Covered households
as a group, however, increase their other saving, which appears to
reflect an effect of the kind suggested. This evidence, it must be em-
phasized, is based on a sample survey of a select population that cannot
be considered representative of the population of the United
States. Nevertheless, the argument of the next chapter, which describes
the sample, is that these data may be indicative of the future effects of
pension plans and may magnify but should not distort their present
effects.
The increase in aggregate personal saving to be inferred from these
data implies an increase in aggregate national saving only if the other
two economic sectors—government and business—do not reduce their
saving by enough to offset the increase. Although nothing definite is
known about their reactions to pension plans, there are strong grounds
for believing that their saving isaffected comparatively little.See
Chapter 6.
Payments from pension funds to retired workers must also be taken
into account. When and if the funds stop growing (that is, when they
have been in effect a long time and if the labor force stops growing),
payments will just balance contributions plus interest earnings. Pre-
sumably their effect on saving will then be nil—at that time, indeed,
aggregate net saving in the economy solely to provide for old age may
approximate zero. That time is not yet in sight; the labor force will
continue to grow within the foreseeable future. Present payments to
retired workers (if nearly all spent on consumer goods, as seems likely)
offset part of the effect on saving of contributions to pension plans.
These payments therefore must be deducted in figuring the net effect,
which may be described as the combination of three quantities: the net
growth in pension funds (contributions plus interest earnings less bene-
fit payments), the change in business and government saving, and the
change in personal saving in other forms. -